The following bill was introduced on May 18, 1999 as H.R. 1838. It was marked up by the House International Relations Committee on October 26, 1999 and amended as S. 693, by a vote of 32-6. It was adopted by the House
of Representatives on February 1, 2000 by a vote of 341-70.
The original version contained more specific details on the military equipment to be sold to Taiwan. This included satellite early warning data, air-to-air missiles, advanced fighters, AWACS, diesel-powered submarines, anti-submarine systems, Aegis destroyers, and others. The amended version does not contain any references to weapons equipment. There are other changes in S. 693, such as additional reporting requirements.
Below is the text of the amended version, S. 693:
A BILL
To assist in the enhancement of the security of Taiwan, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Taiwan Security Enhancement Act'.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(8) The Taiwan Relations Act establishes on the part of the United States a continuing connection with and concern for Taiwan and its people.
Continued adherence to the Act will help Taiwan to maintain its democracy free of coercion and to safeguard its people from the use of force against them. Furthermore, the maintenance by Taiwan of forces adequate for its defense is in the interest of the United States in that it helps to maintain peace in the Western Pacific region.
(9) The military modernization and weapons procurement efforts by the People's Republic of China, as documented in the February 1, 1999, report
by the Secretary of Defense on 'The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait', could threaten cross-Strait stability and United States interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
(10) The Taiwan Relations Act provides explicit guarantees that the United States will make available defense articles and services necessary in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability.
(11) The Taiwan Relations Act requires timely reviews by United States military authorities of Taiwan's defense needs in connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress.
(12) Congress and the President are committed by the Taiwan Relations Act to determine the nature and quantity of Taiwan's legitimate self-defense needs.
(13) It is the policy of the United States to reject any attempt to curb the provision by the United States of defense articles and services legitimately needed for Taiwan's self-defense.
(14) In accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States has, since 1979, sold defensive weapons to Taiwan, and such sales have helped Taiwan maintain its autonomy and freedom. The Congress supports
the continued provision of additional defense articles and defense services in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.
(15) It is in the national interest of the United States to eliminate ambiguity and convey with clarity continued United States support for Taiwan, its people, and their ability to maintain their democracy free from coercion and their society free from the use of force against them. Lack of clarity could lead to unnecessary misunderstandings or confrontations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, with grave consequences for the security of the Western Pacific
region.
(16) A possible consequence of such ambiguity and lack of clarity was the People's Republic of China's decision to conduct military exercises and live fire missile tests in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996,
necessitating House Concurrent Resolution 148, approved by the House of Representatives by a vote of 369-14 on March 19, 1996, and by the Senate by a vote of 97-0 on March 21, 1996, which stated that 'the United States, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act and the constitutional process of the United States, and consistent with its friendship with and commitment to the democratic government and people of Taiwan, should assist in defending them against invasion, missile attack, or blockade by the People's Republic of China.'. Immediately following Congressional passage of House Concurrent Resolution 148, the United States deployed on an emergency basis two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait, after which the People's Republic of China ceased further planned military exercises.
(17) An earlier consequence of such ambiguity and lack of clarity was the expressed surprise by the People's Republic of China that Congress and the American people fully supported President Lee Teng-hui's private visit
to his alma mater, Cornell University, necessitating House Concurrent Resolution 53, approved by the House of Representatives by a vote of 390-0 on May 2, 1995, and by the Senate by a vote of 97-1 on May 9, 1995,
which stated such support explicitly.
SEC. 3. TRAINING OF MILITARY OFFICERS AND SALE OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES TO TAIWAN.
SEC. 4. DETERMINATIONS OF DEFENSE NEEDS OF TAIWAN .
SEC. 5. STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN.
- (a) MAINTENANCE OF SUFFICIENT SELF-DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF TAIWAN- Congress finds that any determination of the nature or quantity of defense articles or defense services to be made available to Taiwan that is made on
any basis other than section 3(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3302(b)), whether such alternative basis is the August 17, 1982, communique signed with the People's Republic of China, or any similar executive agreement, order, or policy, would violate the intent of Congress in the enactment of such Act.
- (b) COMBINED TRAINING AND PERSONNEL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS- Not later than 210 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall implement a plan for the enhancement of programs and arrangements for
operational training and exchanges of senior officers between the Armed Forces of the United States and the armed forces of Taiwan for work in threat analysis, doctrine, force planning, operational methods, and
other areas. At least 30 days prior to such implementation, the Secretary of Defense shall submit the plan to Congress, in classified and unclassified form.
- (c) REPORT REGARDING MAINTENANCE OF SUFFICIENT SELF-DEFENSE CAPABILITIES- Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Congress, in classified and unclassified form, an annual report on the security situation in the Taiwan Strait. Such report shall include an analysis of the military forces facing Taiwan from the People's Republic of China, evaluating recent additions to the offensive military capability of
the People's Republic of China. The report shall include, but not be limited to, an analysis of the surface and subsurface naval threats, the ballistic missile threat, the air threat, and the threat to the military and civilian
communications links in Taiwan. The report shall include a review of the steps taken by the armed forces of Taiwan to address its security situation.
- (d) COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN MILITARY COMMANDS- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall certify to the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that direct secure communications exist between the armed forces of the United States and the armed forces of Taiwan.
- (e) RELATION TO ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT- Nothing in this section supersedes or modifies the application of section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act to the sale of any defense article or defense service under this section.
SEC. 6. REPORT REGARDING THE ABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO RESPOND IN ASIA-PACIFIC CONTINGENCIES THAT INCLUDE TAIWAN.
Sources:
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/hr1838.htm
http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/IS-991026-TSEA.htm
www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/crs-RS20370.pdf